We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential...

We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers' behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result,...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: the...

This is a systematic experimental comparison of the efficiency and competitive properties of a computerized multiunit tatonnement with or without a dynamic improvement rule, with or without publicity of order flow information. All versions of the tatonnement are comparatively less efficient than...

The assumption that under optimal nodal pricing passive transmission line owners collect all the congestion rents on a constrained line, as well as incremental loss rents, is not supported by the experimental results in a three-node radial network system with four buyers and six generators at...