Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

A buyer seeking to outsource production may be able to find ways to reduce a potential supplier's cost, e.g., by suggesting improvements to the supplier's proposed production methods. We study how a buyer could use such "cost reduction investigations" by proposing a three-step supplier selection...

We provide two novel dynamic double auction (DA) mechanisms for a class of economies and study their convergence property to competitive equilibrium. For DA mechanisms, we find a parameter on the two sequences of the marginal bid increments (bid step-size) and ask decrements (ask step-size) that...

We model a spectrum auction where firms purchase units to participate in a constrained, multi-product, downstream market. We use dynamic programming techniques to numerically solve for the optimal bidding strategy in a clock auction. Firms value constraining competitor market power, so...

Reputation systems constitute an important institution to help sustain trust in online auction markets. However, only half of buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all of it is positive. In this paper, I propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates (not necessarily in...

We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incompleteinformation by an evolutionary setup postulating (i) minimal common knowledge, (ii) optimal responses to conjectural beliefs how others behave and (iii) evolutionary selection of conjectural beliefs...

This paper studies sequential auctions in the presence of Knightian uncertainty about the distribution of values. We propose equilibrium notions based on the multiple selves approach to deal with the possible time inconsistency that arises with dynamic bidding for max-min bidders. We...

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other...

Analysis of welfare in auctions comes traditionally via one of two approaches: precise but fragile inference of the exact details of a setting from data or robust but coarse theoretical price of anarchy bounds that hold in any setting. As markets get more and more dynamic and bidders become more...

A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game that is built on a two-player game g. We generalize Arad and Rubinstein's model assuming that every player meets each of his opponents twice to play a (possibly) asymmetric game g in alternating roles (using sports terminology, once "at home" and once...