Showing 1 - 10 of 561
In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms … and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue … that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365875
payment is the only reputation building tool available to the manager. If the investor's prior beliefs about the manager … an additional tool available for building reputation. Information sharing disciplines the potential opportunism accruing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009042
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263146
This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a "pooling" type---with high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536902
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858
This paper illustrates the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779201
This paper examines the intricacies associated with the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and inter-bidder resale, where the winner resells to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779300
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders' valuations. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782112
Collusive equilibria in share auctions despite being the focus of previous theoretical research, have received little empirical or experimental support. We develop a theoretical model of uniform price initial public offering (IPO) auctions and show that there exists a continuum of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321810
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321996