The paper reports on the e¤ects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants' efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard...

This paper studies a class of games, quot;All-Pay Contestsquot;, which captures general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and Ramp;D races. Players compete for one of several identical prizes by...

We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream. This setting may be appropriate for industries where inputs are procured via auction-like “requests for proposal.” For example, Drennan et al (2020) reports that a model of this type was used during the CVS-Aetna merger...

This paper proposes a two step procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First, we use a reduced form test to short-list bidders whose bidding behavior is at-odds with competitive bidding; and Second, we estimate the (latent) cost for these bidders under...