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. We assess the performance of these auctions in a controlled experimental environment. The experiment has two treatments …: first-price and second-price auctions supplemented with Crémer–McLean lotteries. In the experiment, subjects cannot opt out …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084315
We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084593
activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427695
activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382048
elicited data. As an illustration, the methodology is applied to a double auction experiment, where traders' beliefs about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171499
We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094234
activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352203
Economic theory predicts that in a first-price auction with equal and observable valuations, bidders earn zero profits. Theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge, then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation, bidders will bid less and earn positive profits....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028048
This paper analyzes the trade of an indivisible good within a two-stage mechanism, where a seller first negotiates with one potential buyer about the price of the good. If the negotiation fails to produce a sale, a second 'price sealed' bid auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365906
In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study how sellers set Buy-it-Now prices when buyers have independent private values for a single object for sale. We test the predictions of a model by combining the real auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491157