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Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution : an axiomatic approach

Alon, Shiri; Lehrer, Ehud - In: Games and economic behavior 118 (2019), pp. 60-71

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239076

An incentive-compatible and computationally efficient fog bargaining mechanism

Sim, Kwang Mong - In: Computational economics 62 (2023) 4, pp. 1883-1918

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442569

The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts

Pan, Lijun; Wang, Dazhong - In: Economics letters 208 (2021), pp. 1-6

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013207053

Traders' subjective appraisals : comparison of negotiations and auctions

Yu, Bo; Kersten, Gregory E.; Vahidov, Rustam - In: Journal of organizational computing and electronic commerce 25 (2015) 3, pp. 233-261

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011341835

Role of ambient temperature in influencing willingness to pay in auctions and negotiations

Sinha, Jayati; Bagchi, Rajesh - In: Journal of marketing 83 (2019) 4, pp. 121-138

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176076

It ain't over until it's over : English auctions with subsequent negotiations

Koska, Onur A.; Stähler, Frank - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012426553

Game theory : critical concepts in the social sciences

Baruphakēs, Giannēs (contributor); … - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001595526

Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games

Bichler, Martin; Kohring, Nils; Oberlechner, Matthias; … - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 311 (2023) 2, pp. 660-678

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014336740

Essays on strategic incentives for information revelation

Serrano-Padial, Ricardo - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689759

White knights and the corporate governance of hostile takeovers

Calcagno, Riccardo; Falconieri, Sonia - 2008

We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377390