Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

We provide two novel dynamic double auction (DA) mechanisms for a class of economies and study their convergence property to competitive equilibrium. For DA mechanisms, we find a parameter on the two sequences of the marginal bid increments (bid step-size) and ask decrements (ask step-size) that...

A buyer seeking to outsource production may be able to find ways to reduce a potential supplier's cost, e.g., by suggesting improvements to the supplier's proposed production methods. We study how a buyer could use such "cost reduction investigations" by proposing a three-step supplier selection...

We model a spectrum auction where firms purchase units to participate in a constrained, multi-product, downstream market. We use dynamic programming techniques to numerically solve for the optimal bidding strategy in a clock auction. Firms value constraining competitor market power, so...

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

“King Solomon's Dilemma” is based on a biblical story and this can be considered as an allocation problem for an indivisible object among two players. An allocation is first-best if a social planner wants to assign the object without payment to the player whose valuation is the highest. We...

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

In de Clippel, Saran, and Serrano (2019), it is shown that, perhaps surprisingly, the set of implementable social choice functions is essentially the same whether agents have bounded depth of reasoning or rational expectations. The picture is quite different when taking into account the...

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...