We propose a novel approach to the modelling of behavior in first-price and all-pay auctions that builds on the use of a heuristic to achieve an Impulse Balance Equilibrium. The resulting individual decision-making model, nIBE, assumes no expected profit-maximization and accommodates any...

The right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) granted by the seller to a buyer that allows the favored buyer to purchase the asset at the highest price the seller can obtain from other competing buyers is common in auctions and other economic transactions. Yet the predictions of the theory on the impact of...

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

The paper reports on the e¤ects of one-sided imperfect information on bidding behaviour in simultaneous and sequential first-price auctions of non-identical objects when bidders have multi-unit demands. The analysis provides the following four main results. First, when different objects are to...

This paper examines bidding behavior in a setting where post-bid-letting project modifications occur. These modifications change both the costs and payouts to the winning contractor, making the contract incomplete. Recent empirical research shows that bidders incorporate the likelihood of such...

By reviewing the current Xetra auction price mechanism and analyzing its economic properties, we discover that Xetra auction price is generically non market-clearing and that only limit prices are considered as Xetra auction price, which prevents a market-clearing price but not a limit price...

It is widely accepted that the information technology (IT) industry has high clockspeed. This very phenomenon has led to IT OEMs finding themselves selling new generation models only to be left holding returned merchandise from older generations. Similarly, customers who migrate to newer...

A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization auction for use in wholesale electric power markets with an intention to lower procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns have been raised for this proposal while assuming that the...

This paper proposes liquidity subsidies for improving allocative efficiency and price discovery in multi-unit auctions. In the proposed subsidy scheme, the market administrator divides some amount of subsidy revenue between agents proportional to their marginal contribution to the slope of...