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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn - 2016
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006530
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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn - 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
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An Externality-Robust Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2016
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151381
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Bidding in common value fair division games : conference paper
Becker, Alice; Brünner, Tobias - 2013
In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we find many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341148
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Cheap-talk communication in procurement auctions : theory and experiment
Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang - 2020
and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and … the winning supplier have misaligned interests regarding the terms, the buyer benefits from ex-ante communication relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341
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Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions : Theory and Experiment
Onderstal, Sander - 2020
and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have … auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and … the winning supplier have misaligned interests regarding the terms, the buyer benefits from ex-ante communication relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840965
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Competition modulates buyers' reaction to sellers' cheap talk
Onderstal, Sander; Shalvi, Shaul; Soraperra, Ivan - 2023
-binding price requests. Using a laboratory experiment, we examine how competition moderates the way such cheap-talk communication … granularity effects of cheap-talk communication on negotiation outcomes. Our results show that most of these effects survive with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299618
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Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions
Lee, Jaesun; Shapiro, Dmitry - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 212 (2023), pp. 74-107
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472102
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Collusion in multiobject auctions : an experimental evidence
Matousek, Jindrich; Cingl, Lubomir - 2015
to collude among bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel. The results suggest that the … combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined … allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages makes the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305158
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197