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Franke, Jörg; Metzger, Lars - 2023

We consider a simple contest game with draws where with some probability none of the contestants is selected as winner. If such an outcome occurs, then the contest is repeated in the next period unless either one of the contestants wins the prize or until a final last period is reached. Allowing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014285495

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values

Saran, Rene - 2010

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432

Profit-Maximizing Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Valuations

Kuang, Zhonghong; Shen, Weiran; Wu, Fan - 2023

We study the profit-maximizing mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent valuations. The seller privately observes the item's quality, while the buyer privately knows his type of valuation. The seller's valuation only depends on the quality, and the buyer's valuation depends on both the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014344355

Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2012

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n k bidders each demand one object. Before the auction, each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world. The good that is auctioned is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009632293

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Reputational concerns in repeated rent-seeking contests

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke - 2016

We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456852

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2009

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199987

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215953

The effect of reputation on selling prices in auctions

Gürtler, Oliver; Grund, Christian - 2006

In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms … and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue … that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365875