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Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 4, pp. 2714-2731

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013368302

Sequential procurement with contractual and experimental learning

Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela - 2019

We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065183

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

The economics of information : lying and cheating in markets and organizations

Molho, Ian - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012939348

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366