Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,643
Cover Image
Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
Cover Image
Sequential Contests with Incomplete Information : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Brookins, Philip; Matros, Alexander; Tzachrista, Foteini - 2022
In this paper, we investigate behavior in two-player sequential-move contests with complete and incomplete information about the value of the prize, theoretically and experimentally. First, we describe a Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential contest in which both players have private prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237552
Cover Image
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games
Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael - 2011
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180095
Cover Image
Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
Cover Image
Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information
Metzger, Lars P. - 2015
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
Cover Image
Strategies under strategic uncertainty
Mass, Helene - 2018
I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016
Cover Image
Essays on strategic incentives for information revelation
Serrano-Padial, Ricardo - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689759
Cover Image
Fighting collusion : an implementation theory approach
Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Péter - 2021
A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309
Cover Image
Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining
Zhang, Jun - 2016
In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366
Cover Image
Simultaneous signaling in elimination contests
Zhang, Jun (contributor) - 2008
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858