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Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; de Vries, Casper G. - 2009
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals …&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325768
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Contests with rank-order spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2009 - Revised: April 2009
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that … economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals …&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808
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Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456
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Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.<p>This paper has been accepted by <A href …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257530
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The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests
Müller, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390690
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The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests: An Auction-based Approach
Müller, Daniel - 2010
We analyze the infuence of the number of competitors, the costs of doping and the distribution of talents on the doping behavior. In an n-player strategic game modelled as an all-pay auction, the players have private information about their talent and the amount of doping. The main finding of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270749
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The doping threshold in sport contests
Müller, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772194
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The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests
Mueller, Daniel - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2013
<span style="font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"">We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of...</span>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011152781
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The Herodotus paradox
Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 399-406
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049903
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Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition
Dekel, Eddie; Jackson, Matthew; Wolinsky, Asher - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2007
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders' valuations. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588742