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Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - In: Review of Economic Design 19 (2015) 1, pp. 25-46

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money that they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the offered quality of the technology or good. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240970

The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests

Mueller, Daniel - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2013

<span style="font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"">We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of...</span>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011152781

Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256628

Contests with Rank-Order Spillovers

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.<p>This paper has been accepted by <A href …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257530

All-pay aspects of decision making under public scrutiny

Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - Department of Economics and Related Studies, University …

We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. In our first group of applications, individual members of some institution—due to public pressure or expectation—propose reductions of their own income, e.g., corporate board members reducing their bonus payments in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386037

Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences

Klose, Bettina; Schweinzer, Paul - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817294

Contests with rank-order spillovers

Baye, Michael; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper - In: Economic Theory 51 (2012) 2, pp. 315-350

-order contests with complete information, in which each player’s strategy generates direct or indirect affine “spillover” effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of litigation, and a host of other contests. Copyright The Author(s) 2012 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993551

The Herodotus paradox

Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 399-406

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049903

Semi-Public Contests

Prüfer, Jens - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2009

been neglected by the economic literature but exists frequently in practice. I show how semi-public contests can mitigate a … semi-public contest mechanism but refrain from direct public funding of contests. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092791

Fuzzy Price-Quality Ratio Procurement under Incomplete Information

Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - Department of Economics and Related Studies, University … - 2012

We analyse a procurement auction in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the quality of the technology or good they offer. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133556

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