-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …

Auctions are a prevalent way to exchange goods and are well-studied for the exchange of rivalrous goods, but are less … price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are … are given under which collusion in a group auction results in higher prices. …

behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal suppliers and inelastic demand. The price increase can be traced … back to an abuse of the auction’s pay-as-bid mechanism by the two largest firms. In contrast to theoretical findings, we … show that pay-as-bid auctions do not necessarily reduce incentives for strategic capacity withholding and collusive …