We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal … optimal mechanisms can be implemented as uniquely collusion-proof mechanisms. …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

alternative is to design auctions that hinder collusion. Since Abreu et al. (1986), economic theory has emphasized imperfect …Auctioneers suspecting bidder collusion often lack the formal evidence needed for legal recourse. A practical … monitoring as a constraint on collusion, but evidence remains scarce on whether: (i) information frictions meaningfully limit …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …

During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …

In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …