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Optimal framing of scores in procurement auctions
Fugger, Nicolas; Paul, Christian; Wambach, Achim - In: Supply Management Research : aktuelle …, (pp. 77-92). 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952487
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Collusion in dynamic buyer-determined reverse auctions
Fugger, Nicolas; Katok, Elena; Wambach, Achim - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 2, pp. 518-533
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446244
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689581
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Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism ; conference paper
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2013
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342227
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Information acquisition during a descending auction
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 55 (2014) 3, pp. 731-751
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346564
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Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions : an experimental investigation
Gillen, Philippe; Rasch, Alexander; Wambach, Achim; … - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 81 (2016) 4, pp. 511-534
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594130
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Auctions vs. negotiations: The case of favoritism
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291548
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Auctions vs. Negotiations : The Case of Favoritism
Gretschko, Vitali - 2013
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089156