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We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
The tender spread, i.e. the difference between the effective price for money in the ECB’s main refinancing operations and the prevailing policy rate, is one of the main determinants behind the evolution of the EONIA with respect to the ECB’s operational target. This study assesses the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011605027
The tender spread, i.e. the difference between the effective price for money in the ECB's main refinancing operations and the prevailing policy rate, is one of the main determinants behind the evolution of the EONIA with respect to the ECB's operational target. This study assesses the reasons...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826027
I develop a framework to study common situations, in which substitute goods are sold in separate, good-specific multi-unit (pay-as-bid) auctions. I characterize bidding behavior and investigate auction design features that could increase revenues. The setting I develop gives rise to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898325
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We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389
How willing are individual primary dealers to alter their offered yields in central bank quantitative easing auctions of government bonds in order to sell an additional share of the outstanding amount of a bond to the central bank? This question is of great importance for a central bank's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489780
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It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other bidders' valuations. Nevertheless, an informative public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293376