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This paper considers the social costs implied by inefficient allocation of contracts in a first price, sealed bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders. We adopt a constrained (piecewise linear) strategy equilibrium concept and estimate the structural parameters of the bidders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321543
Reverse auctions are considered a fast and inexpensive price discovery tool to award procurement contracts and it is often desirable to award contracts to more than one supplier. We propose a new procurement procedure that is based on a reverse auction. Shares are allocated endogenously,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011448760
Procurement auctions that assume independent private values (IPV) provide a benchmark for analysis that is readily demonstrated but often unrealistic. Firms who compete for exclusive selling rights normally derive outputs from a highly similar set of inputs which, in turn, allows them to obtain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582261
In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the suppliers to reveal information that will help the buyer to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341
We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners' opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners' bids, overall...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011636462
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
Aftermarket social welfare is largely determined by a procurement auction design. Auctions select firms for operating aftermarkets, and auctions may also impose restrictions on aftermarket prices the winner can charge. This paper compares aftermarket social welfare generated by first-price and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014446446
This paper examines some of the flaws in Medicare's pricing system and considers some potential fixes. As currently structured, Medicare's reimbursement system stifles incentives to seek lower prices. Prices are recommended by provider groups and centrally administered. With what amounts to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822898
This paper studies the competitive effects of vertical integration between pharmaceutical drug producers and distributors in an auction setting. Utilizing data on 814,000 public procurement auctions in Russia, I identify the causal effect of vertical integration on the procurement prices of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079980
This paper examines bidding behavior in a setting where post-bid-letting project modifications occur. These modifications change both the costs and payouts to the winning contractor, making the contract incomplete. Recent empirical research shows that bidders incorporate the likelihood of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397241