Showing 1 - 10 of 11
"Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009006874
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009732266
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419836
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933533
Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128845
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046604
We study reserve prices computed to maximize the expected profit of the seller based on historical observations of incomplete bid data typically available to the auction designer in online auctions for advertising or e-commerce. This direct approach to computing reserve prices circumvents the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916910
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623341
We study reserve prices computed to maximize the expected profit of the seller based on historical observations of incomplete bid data typically available to the auction designer in online auctions for advertising or e-commerce. This direct approach to computing reserve prices circumvents the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453022
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458142