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We model uniform and discriminatory auctions in wholesale electricity markets. High variability of electricity prices is often explained by exogenous economic factors. We, however, show that it can result endogenously from suppliers' strategic bidding, and that the connection between demand and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044835
When the winner of one auction gains a cost advantage in the next, bids reflect not only the value of winning the auction, but also the value of gaining an incumbent advantage in future auctions. If a larger firm's advantage derives from a cost or product advantage, it has a greater chance of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047255
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196760
In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206068
This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211854
Researchers and experts have typically viewed electronic auctions (such as those implemented by eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo!) as either oral, ascending-price (English) auctions or second-price, sealed-bid (Vickrey) auctions. I show that significant differences exist, both theoretical and practical,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214033
Developing countries are introducing private financing in road construction and operation. Franchising process is more and more made though auctions. Private participation is not without problems, some of which are due to the auction design. In this paper we seek to point out the main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122944
We run experiments of first-price auctions with two groups, by which we directly detect the presence of bidders' loss aversion. Each human bidder bids against three pre-programmed computer bidders -- computers independently draw their values from the uniform distribution and bid their values in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080043
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur a participation cost (and observe a private signal), or forego competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082776
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139280