This paper shows that Rubinstein’s results on the two-player electronic mail game do not extend to the N-player electronic mail game.

As shown by Rubinstein (1989, AER), in the two-player electronic mail game, players are better off if the extent to which they can check each other’s information, check each other’s information about each other’s information, etc., is limited. This paper investigates to what...

In a two-player stag hunt with asymmetric information, players may lock each other into requiring a large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another before eventually acting. This intuition has been formalized in the electronic mail game (EMG). The literature...

This paper analyzes consumers' choices between, as well as behavior within three selling mechanisms which are frequently used in online marketplaces: posted prices, ascending auctions and Buy-It-Now auctions. In an exploratory experiment, where subjects choose between one mechanism and an...