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Direct transfers allow heirs to freely use what has been passed on to them. Bequeathers who do not trust their descendants to make proper use of the fortune may prefer investing it in a safe foundation, thereby limiting their descendants’ autonomy. In our study we compare experimentally these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866700
We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866824
We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600571
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266323
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003778086
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780887
We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780890
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003410445