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Competing mechanisms

Peters, Michael - In: The Canadian journal of economics 47 (2014) 2, pp. 373-397

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010466500

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

Peters, Michael - In: Review of economic design : RED 4 (1999) 3, pp. 273-292

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001427082

Surplus extraction and competition

Peters, Michael - In: The review of economic studies 68 (2001) 3, pp. 613-631

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001608809

A competitive distribution of auctions

Peters, Michael - In: The review of economic studies 64 (1997) 1, pp. 97-123

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001239956

Competing mechanisms

Peters, Michael - In: The handbook of market design, (pp. 609-628). 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010206182

Limit equilibria for problems where sellers compete in mechanisms

Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000878371

An ascending double auction

Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 37 (2008) 2, pp. 281-306

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003753499

Internet auctions with many traders

Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei - In: Journal of economic theory 130 (2006) 1, pp. 220-245

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379299

Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

Peters, Michael - In: Journal of economic theory 75 (1997) 1, pp. 141-179

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001221920

Internet Auctions with Many Traders

Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei - 2014

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogenous good, set reserve prices at their own independent second-price auctions. Each buyer has a private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089703