This paper considers the optimal design of dynamic research contests when the buyer can set time-dependent prizes. We derive the buyer-optimal contest and show that it entails an increasing prize schedule. Remarkably, this allows the buyer to implement a global stopping rule. In particular, the...

This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...

This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...

Along the standard measures of price dispersion, this paper proposes a new method, the residual variance model, to examine the levels of price and price variation within and across 10 kinds of physically identical products on eBay UK. The results find that the price levels and price dispersions...

In the paper I study profitability of the name-your-own-price mechanism (NYOP) in the presence of risk-averse buyers. First, I provide conditions that guarantee that for the monopolistic seller the NYOP is more profitable than the posted-price. Second, I consider a more competitive framework...

We examine the properties of all-pay contests in the spirit of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) as the number of entrants grows large under organizer objectives of expected and expected maximum outcomes. Unlike the case with a small number of entrants, with a large number of entrants a single prize...

This paper presents a short survey of theoretical research in takeover auctions. It concentrates on the models of preemptive jump bidding and the effect of toeholds as well as the models that investigate the combination of these two effects

How homes sell matters for housing price dynamics. Auction prices forecast better, display less momentum and help forecast economic activity much better than negotiated prices. This is consistent with mechanisms transmitting buyer vs. seller shocks to prices differently and, in light of auction...

Principal-agent relationships between the supervisory board and the management of bidding firms in auctions are widespread in high-stakes auctions. Often only the agent has information about the value of the objects being sold. The board wants to maximize the profit, but the management wants to...

Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at cross-border level: the...