This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been … bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: As the numbers of winning and losing … bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It is …

whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of … properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions, (ii) the cardinality of each partition is …

bidders have differential information about their common resale opportunities: each bidder privately observes an independent …

information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered …

understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact …