We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …

We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders information, for a fixed … that can arise, and identify the information structure that minimizes revenue. The extremal information structure that … across all information structures. The extremal information structure that simultaneously attains these bounds entails an …

information structure is chosen adversarially by Nature to minimize profit. We construct what we term a strong maxmin solution to … this joint mechanism design and information design problem, which consists of a mechanism, an information structure, and an … deviator can select the new equilibrium. We show the mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism …

:(i) Maximize over mechanisms the minimum over information structures and equilibria of expected profit;(ii) Minimize over … information structures the maximum over mechanisms and equilibria of expected profit.These programs are shown to have the same … family of linear programs that relax (ii) produce, for any finite number of signals, an information structure with a …