We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been … bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: As the numbers of winning and losing … bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It is …

design and information design problem, consisting of a mechanism, an information structure, and an equilibrium, such that … equilibrium. The mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design …

in its effect on allocational efficiency and information aggregation …

information structure is chosen adversarially by Nature to minimize profit. We construct what we term a strong maxmin solution to … this joint mechanism design and information design problem, which consists of a mechanism, an information structure, and an … deviator can select the new equilibrium. We show the mechanism and information structure solve a family of maxmin mechanism …

:(i) Maximize over mechanisms the minimum over information structures and equilibria of expected profit;(ii) Minimize over … information structures the maximum over mechanisms and equilibria of expected profit.These programs are shown to have the same … family of linear programs that relax (ii) produce, for any finite number of signals, an information structure with a …