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Fees, incentives, and efficiency in large double auctions
Jantschgi, Simon; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; … - 2022
Fees are omnipresent in markets but, with few exceptions, are omitted in economic models-such as Double Auctions-of these markets. Allowing for general fee structures, we show that their impact on incentives and efficiency in large Double Auctions hinges on whether the fees are homogeneous (as,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040914
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Bidding for Incompete Contracts
Bajari, Patrick; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steven - 2004
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325015
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Balanced Unit Prices, the Case for Split Award Unit-Price Auctions
Renes, Sander - 2012
Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory has shown that they can attract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115145
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Timing of Auctions of Real Options
Cong, Lin William - 2019
This paper endogenizes auction timing and initiation in auctions of real options. Because bidders have information rent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905534
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Unique Equilibrium in Contests with Incomplete Information
Ewerhart, Christian - 2018
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the … general conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In … concavity and convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for uniqueness include independent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799
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Auctioning IT Contracts with Renegotiable Scope
Huang, He; Li, Zhipeng; Liu, De; XU, Hongyan - 2021
's information rent, by choosing the initial project scope and her investment in the quality of the project. We find that a buyer may … bargaining power and the quality uncertainty is low. Broadening the initial scope reduces information rent but leaves little room …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215390
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Reserve Prices in Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
Shi, Xinyan - 2010
consider a static auction in which one bidder has perfect information about the value of the object and the other does not have … any private information. I derive the optimal reserve price and find that the optimal reserve price is always lower in a …. I then consider a dynamic auction in which an informed bidder obtains private information in two consecutive periods. I …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145409
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Bidding for incompete contracts
Bajari, Patrick L.; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steve - 2004
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607047
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Bidding for Incomplete Contracts
Bajari, Patrick; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steven - 2005
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068407
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Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement : An Empirical Analysis
Bajari, Patrick; McMillan, Robert Stanton; Tadelis, Steven - 2003
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032747