An auction is viewed as a process that in equilibrium generates a binary lottery for each bidder, which the bidder "buys" with his bid. This view allows for a simple way to consistently assess differences in bidding behavior over different bidders and different auctions. E.g. all auctions...

An auction is viewed as a process that in equilibrium generates a binary lottery for each bidder, which the bidder buys with his bid. This view allows for a simple way to consistently assess differences in bidding behavior over different bidders and different auctions. E.g. all auctions covered...

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts "early" and a group of players who choose "late". Only the...

In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition. -- Sequential all-pay auction ; complete...

We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way, that is, she can favor specific contestants through the choice of contest success functions in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The scope for revenue enhancement through biasing is analyzed and...