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When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325015
Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector â€¦
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115145
This paper endogenizes auction timing and initiation in auctions of real options. Because bidders have information rent, a seller faces a "virtual strike price" higher than the actual exercise cost. She inefficiently delays the auction to encourage bidder participation and utilizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905534
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799
Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model where a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract's scope. In this model, the buyer balances the need to incentivize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215390
In this paper, I study common-value auctions with two asymmetrically informed bidders and a reserve price. First, I consider a static auction in which one bidder has perfect information about the value of the object and the other does not have any private information. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013145409
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607047
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068407
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032747
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002994003