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A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012
/2; if neither offer falls into the interval, there is no settlement. Comparisons are made with other bargaining mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
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Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information
Metzger, Lars P. - 2015
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
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Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
Hain, Roland; Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001603075
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Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001603077
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Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
Hain, Roland; Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538943
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Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001 - Revised on March 2001
In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539813
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Information acquisition in conflicts
Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010
This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950481
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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining
Zhang, Jun - 2016
this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in … if resale is prohibited. We find that the seller's revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer's bargaining power … in the resale market. When the publicly known buyer has full bargaining power, Myerson's optimal revenue is achieved …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366
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Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity : leading examples
Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2021
In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012488699