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Ex Post Efficiency in the Buyer?S Bid Double Auction When Demand Can Be Arbitrarily Larger than Supply

Zacharias, Eleutherios; Williams, Steven R. - 2000

We examine the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer?s bid double auction for sequences of markets in which … convergence to efficiency for all sequences of m and n for which n/m is bounded above …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184301

Information disclosure by a seller in a sequential first-price auction

Azacis, Helmuts - 2017

I study a sequential first-price auction where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689443

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Auction design with data-driven misspecifications : inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation

Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1543-1579

We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135356

Coalition-proof Ambiguous Mechanism

Guo, Huiyi - 2021

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous mechanisms are allowed and agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers, we prove that all efficient allocations are implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242607

No price envy in the multi-unit object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences

Shinozaki, Hiroki - 2022

propose a new property of fairness: no price envy. It extends the standard no envy test (Foley, 1967) over bundles to prices … (per-unit payments), and requires no agent envy other agents' prices to his own in the sense that if he has a chance to … no price envy and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is an inverse uniform-price rule. Then, we identify the unique …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880250

Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459

A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics, Christoph - 2014

In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703

Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment : extending to the multi-period case

Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014

This paper studies the optimal mechanism for a seller (she) that sells, in a sequence of periods, an indivisible object per period to the same buyer (he). Buyer's willingness to pay remains constant along time and is his private information. The seller can commit to the current period mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402241

Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment

Beccuti, Juan I. - 2014

This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyer's willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting, the seller cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402248