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Zero-intelligence trading without resampling

Li Calzi, Marco; Pellizzari, Paolo - In: Complexity and artificial markets, (pp. 3-14). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003762977

Which market protocols facilitate fair trading?

Li Calzi, Marco; Pellizzari, Paolo - In: Artificial markets modeling : methods and applications, (pp. 81-97). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854747

Symmetric equilibria in double auctions with markdown buyers and markup sellers

Cervone, Roberto; Galavotti, Stefano; Li Calzi, Marco - In: Artificial economics : the generative method in …, (pp. 81-92). 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003889286

Convergence of outcomes and evolution of strategic behavior in double auctions

Fano, Shira; Li Calzi, Marco; Pellizzari, Paolo - In: Journal of evolutionary economics : JEE 23 (2013) 3, pp. 513-538

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009773934

Allocative efficiency and traders' protection under zero intelligence behavior

Li Calzi, Marco; Milone, Luciano Marcello; Pellizzari, Paolo - In: Computational methods in economic dynamics : [selected …, (pp. 5-28). 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009268743

Learning to trade in an unbalanced market

Hauser, Florian; Li Calzi, Marco - In: Emergent results of artificial economics : [... in its …, (pp. 65-76). 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235231

Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

Li Calzi, Marco; Pavan, Alessandro - In: European economic review : EER 49 (2005) 1, pp. 227-250

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002388989

Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

Li Calzi, Marco; Pavan, Alessandro - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001753228

Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions

Li Calzi, Marco; Pavan, Alessandro - 2003

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591198