There is a veritable menagerie of auctions — single dimensional, multi-dimensional, single sided, double sided, first price, second price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed bid — and these have been extensively discussed and analysed in the economics literature. The main purpose of this paper...

This chapter explores the state of the emerging practice of designing markets by the use of agent-based modeling, with special reference to electricity markets and computerized (on-line) markets, perhaps including real-life electronic agents as well as human traders. The paper first reviews the...

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation...

We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex post equilibrium. If there is a significant amount of interdependence, there are multiple...

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and - in economic environments - sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto...

This paper studies a dual that applies to a class of quasilinear exchange economies with indivisible (or divisible) goods in search for an equilibrium. Our model aims at an economy with a large scale and an agent's revealed demand or supply is contaminated with stochastic errors (noises). Thus,...

In this paper we prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium and a bilateral oligopoly equilibrium in a two-period two-good trading model with production. In a static two good framework, trade can only take place only if there is sufficient diversity in the preferences of the consumers....

We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in private values and quasi-linear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent’s type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a non-empty set of...

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path...

Poor user experiences with search advertisements can lead to ad avoidance thus reduce search engine’s long-term revenue. We capture the effect of negative user experiences on search engine’s future revenue in a new variable called “shadow costs” and examine the optimal keyword auction...