Similar Search Results

Matros, Alexander - 2018

We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919103

Generalization of the K-Price Auction Revisited

Nawar, Abdel-Hameed - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733006

Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions

Dijk, Justin - 2017

We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners' opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model predicts individual landowners' bids, overall...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012959334

Buyouts and agglomeration bonuses in wildlife corridor auctions

Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011636462

Auctions versus private negotiations in buyer-seller networks

Watts, Alison - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-14

Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550488

Auctions versus Private Negotiations in Buyer-Seller Networks

Watts, Alison C. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022524

Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts

Hatfield, John William - 2010

of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When … firms' relationships do not exhibit a supply chain structure, stable allocations need not exist. By contrast, in the … presence of supply chain structure, a natural substitutability condition characterizes the maximal domain of firm preferences …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146534

Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions:An experimental investigation

Brosig, Jeannette; Güth, Werner; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708

Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets

Neugebauer, Tibor; Selten, Reinhard - 2002

This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computerized bids. Three treatments were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263057

Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly

Dubey, Pradeep; Sondermann, Dieter - 2003

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263094

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last