This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. The English auction is a tatonnement process and lasts multiple rounds. It is modeled as a sequence of round games. Each round game is a normal form game in which an agent's strategies are his...

We provide two novel dynamic double auction (DA) mechanisms for a class of economies and study their convergence property to competitive equilibrium. For DA mechanisms, we find a parameter on the two sequences of the marginal bid increments (bid step-size) and ask decrements (ask step-size) that...

This paper studies a dual that applies to a class of quasilinear exchange economies with indivisible (or divisible) goods in search for an equilibrium. Our model aims at an economy with a large scale and an agent's revealed demand or supply is contaminated with stochastic errors (noises). Thus,...

We study the convergence of two price processes generated by two dynamic double auctions (DA) and provide conditions under which the two price processes converge to a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy. When the conditions are not satisfied, the price processes may converge to...

This paper studies the double auction (DA) mechanism in Ma and Li (2011) for a class of exchange economies. We extend their results to more general cases where sellers and buyers each form a complex time non-homogeneous Markovian chain, as specified in Ram et al. (2009), in the communication of...

This paper studies the $\alpha-$double auction in Xu et al. (2014) and extends their results to the case where $\alpha$ is time-varying in a manner governed by a time non-homogeneous Markov chain specified in Ram et al. (2009) over a set of states defined by $R\equiv\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \cdots,...