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Li, Shengwu - 2016 - This version: 16 March 2016

A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488403

Reputational concerns in repeated rent-seeking contests

Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke - 2016

We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456852

Reputation, Trust, and Rebates : How Online Auction Markets Can Improve Their Feedback Mechanisms

Li, Lingfang (Ivy) - 2009

Reputation systems constitute an important institution to help sustain trust in online auction markets. However, only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720671

How eBay sellers set 'Buy-it-now' prices : bringing the field into the lab

Grebe, Tim; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2006

In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. The … traders' experience in a real market environment influences their behavior in the lab and whether abstract lab experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365897

The impact of the irrelevant : temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in auctions

Peeters, Ronald; Strobel, Martin; Vermeulen, Dries; … - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-19

With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453215

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions – An Experiment

Brosig, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo - 2011

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer … buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply …In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir die Rolle von Reputation in der Beschaffung mit Hilfe von zwei …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274444

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions - An Experiment

Heinrich, Timo; Brosig-Koch, Jeannette - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182496

Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions : an experiment

Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo - 2011

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer … buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply … price-based procurement ; reputation information ; auction choice ; experimental economics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124333

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations, in which there exists a fully efficient equilibrium. We show that if there are traders that behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study

Andersson, Christer; Andersson, Ola; Andersson, Tommy - 2011

This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theortical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320367