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A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488403
With a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of buy-options and the corresponding buy-price on revenues and bidding behavior in (online) proxy-auctions with independent private valuations. We show that temporary buy-options may reduce revenues for two reasons: At low buy-prices, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453215
In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. The … traders' experience in a real market environment influences their behavior in the lab and whether abstract lab experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365897
We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer … buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply …In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir die Rolle von Reputation in der Beschaffung mit Hilfe von zwei …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274444
We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer … buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply … price-based procurement ; reputation information ; auction choice ; experimental economics …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124333
We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer … buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182496
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations, in which there exists a fully efficient equilibrium. We show that if there are traders that behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theortical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320367
Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281542
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibriumwe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286692