We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental...

We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental...

Procurement auctions for renewable energy support have become a standard policy instrument to stimulate investment in clean energy. Yet, the nexus of award prices and post-auction realization rates of winning projects is not well understood in the literature. We combine auction theory and real...

By means of a constructive example we show that clustering of Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) might give unsatisfactory results of zonal division of energy market. Specifically, we find that the division obtained from clustering of LMPs in some cases may not place the congested lines on the...

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...

In an electricity system, demand and supply have to be balanced in real time. Since most energy is traded before real time already in forward, day-ahead and intraday markets imbalances can occur. To ensure the balance between demand and supply even if power plants deviate from their schedules,...

We study experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty, motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. We study the effect of asymmetric demand-information in the two auction institutions. In our treatment condition some...

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The bids are submitted under uncertainty, before the demand by the Independent System Operator has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer chooses the...

This paper derives a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) of a pay-as-bid auction, also called discriminatory auction. Such an auction is used in the balancing market for electric power in Britain. For some probability distributions of demand a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If demand...

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction - e.g. an electric power auction - under uncertainty, before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the supply function maximizing his expected profit given the...