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constraints. We show that the generalized Vickrey rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012256691
We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of (consumption) bundles. We assume that preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880250
the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673396
desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the … case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418154
We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158937
. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under … which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction’s desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1 …) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159080
-of these markets. Allowing for general fee structures, we show that their impact on incentives and efficiency in large Double …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040914
I study a sequential first-price auction where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689443
rule which satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment uniquely exists …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332345
-called experimenter demand effect. Moreover, providing advice improves efficiency in the Vickrey auction, particularly in the early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012321709