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Guo, Huiyi - 2021

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242607

Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities

Xue, Licun; Zhang, Lingling - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 1, pp. 49-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511732

Bidding rings : a bargaining approach

Chatterjee, Kalyan; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mukherjee, Conan - In: Games and economic behavior 103 (2017), pp. 67-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792279

Similar bidders in takeover contests

Dai, Yun; Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Smit, Han T. J.; De … - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 544-561

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243681

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435