I propose a model of the housing market using a search framework with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signalling device to direct buyers' search....

This is the first study to test for a winner's curse in a bubble market. Our hand-collected sample comprises the entire sequence of bids and the experience of the winning bidder at Irish residential real estate auctions, prior to the collapse of the bubble. Portfolios of practitioner-selected...

This is the first study to test for a winner's curse in a bubble market. Our hand-collected sample comprises the sequence of bids and the experience of the winning bidder at Irish residential real estate auctions, prior to the collapse of the bubble. Portfolios of practitioner- and hedonic...

I develop a dynamic search model of the housing market in which prices, determined by auction, exhibit greater volatility than prices in the search and matching model with Nash bargaining from the literature. This helps solve the puzzle of excess volatility of house prices. The outcomes of the...

I develop a tractable dynamic model of the housing market where the prices are determined in auctions rather than by Nash bargaining as in the housing search model from the literature. The model with auctions mimics the actual housing markets by generating fluctuations between the booms and...

Mechanisms where intermediaries charge a commission fee and have the sellers set the price are widely used in practice e.g. by real estate agents, stock brokers, art galleries, or auction houses. We model competition between intermediaries in a dynamic random matching model, where in every...