We offer experimental and theoretical evidence that large, sealed-bid, multi-unit common value auctions for assets with substantial price uncertainty may be improved through hybrids with a separate retail tranche or ‘public pool.' The auctions in our laboratory experiments incorporate initial...

We study the impact of colors of paintings on prices in the art auction market and incorporate color attributes of non-figurative paintings in pricing models. A one standard deviation increase in the percentages of blue (red) hue leads to premiums of 10.63% (4.20%). We also conduct laboratory...

This is the first study to test for a winner's curse in a bubble market. Our hand-collected sample comprises the sequence of bids and the experience of the winning bidder at Irish residential real estate auctions, prior to the collapse of the bubble. Portfolios of practitioner- and hedonic...

This is the first study to test for a winner's curse in a bubble market. Our hand-collected sample comprises the entire sequence of bids and the experience of the winning bidder at Irish residential real estate auctions, prior to the collapse of the bubble. Portfolios of practitioner-selected...

We present the first direct evidence of algorithmic imprints during batch auctions. Order anticipation is an integral part of high-frequency traders' strategies. Hence, some participants may have economic incentive to encrypt noise in the data. We use machine learning to identify five types of...

This paper examines whether and how bidders' conservative tone in 10-K filings influences the subsequent mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions of these US firms from 1996 to 2013. Based on 39,260 firm-year observations, we find, consistent with behavioural consistency theory, that...

The underpricing of initial public offerings is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book...

We study the behavioral dynamics of limit orders in simultaneous experimental call-auction markets with multiple multiperiod lived securities. As analytical decision variable we use excess bids; the number of submitted bids minus the number of offers. The feedback variable is (excess) return....

We use laboratory experiments to compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible good auctions. 'Standard' and 'uniform' allocation rules admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a 'hybrid' rule. We observe little evidence of revenue differences among the...

Contest or auction designers who want to maximize the overall revenue are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable to exclude the most able contestant in favor...