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This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292335
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269602
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003879353
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003902504
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003914612
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009379495
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157530
This article revisits the no‐recall assumption in job search models with take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178138
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048955
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481312