We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar...

We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...

For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing mechanism (AON). Theoretically, GMS outperforms AON in equilibrium profit and funding success. We test these predictions...

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of...

This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction experiments. The first factor examines subjects' understanding of strategy-proofness (SP), while the second focuses on "human interaction" which includes social preferences (spite and...