-of these markets. Allowing for general fee structures, we show that their impact on incentives and efficiency in large Double …Fees are omnipresent in markets but, with few exceptions, are omitted in economic models-such as Double Auctions …-ask spread fees). Double Auctions with homogeneous fees share the key advantages of Double Auctions without fees: markets with …

—of these markets. Allowing for general fee structures, we show that their impact on incentives and efficiency in large Double …Fees are omnipresent in markets but, with few exceptions, are omitted in economic models—such as Double Auctions …-ask spread fees). Double Auctions with homogeneous fees share the key advantages of Double Auctions without fees: markets with …

constraints. We show that the generalized Vickrey rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual …

the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit …

desirable properties, which highlights the strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency. In contrast, in the … case of two agents and a single object, egalitarian-equivalence is compatible with efficiency. …

necessarily provide the agent with lower incentives to acquire information that prevent either Type I or Type II errors, compared … contingent contracts produce the minimal distortions in the agent's incentives to acquire performance-enhancing information. The …

, steeper securities increase the seller's expected revenue but do not affect the efficiency of the auction. We introduce risk …-averse bidders to analyze the insurance role of steepness and its implications for revenue, efficiency and bidders' endogenous … the allocative efficiency of the auction. In addition, we present two results that are novel to the auction literature. We …