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Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525259
In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843633
In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836639
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable … which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974150
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations, in which there exists a fully efficient equilibrium. We show that if there are traders that behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
We extend the sealed-bid k-double-auction mechanism from a single- to two-round game where offers are made simultaneously during each round. If an agreement is reached on round 1, then the traders realize their profit and the game is over. If not, equipped with information about the round 1 bids...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028808
-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of … the standard all-pay auction is robust to the introduction of "small" identity-dependent externalities. In general …, however, the presence of identity-dependent externalities invalidates well-established qualitative results concerning the set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009747790