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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
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Cheap-talk communication in procurement auctions : theory and experiment
Onderstal, Sander; Yang, Yang - 2020
and in a laboratory experiment. Our theoretical results suggest that in a setting where the buyer and the suppliers have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341
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Experimental Business Research
Rapoport, Amnon (ed.); Zwick, Rami (ed.) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003228257
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Experimental Business Research
Zwick, Rami (ed.); Rapoport, Amnon (ed.) - 2002
Experimental Business Research includes papers that were presented at the First Asian Conference on Experimental Business Research held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), on December 7-10, 1999. The conference was organized by the Center for Experimental Business...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013522448
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Multistage Sealed-Bid k-Double Auctions : An Experimental Study of Bilateral Bargaining
Parco, James E.; Rapoport, Amnon; Seale, Darryl A.; … - 2008
We extend the sealed-bid k-double-auction mechanism from a single- to two-round game where offers are made simultaneously during each round. If an agreement is reached on round 1, then the traders realize their profit and the game is over. If not, equipped with information about the round 1 bids...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028808
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A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Brams, Steven J.; Kaplan, Todd R.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2012
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism whereby for two bargainers, a Buyer and a Seller, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report their reservation prices in the 1st stage. If the Buyer reports a higher price than the Seller, then the referee announces that there is the possibility for trade,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
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Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection
Shachat, Jason - 2013
We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085955
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Markets, games, and strategic behavior : an introduction to experimental economics
Holt, Charles A. - 2019 - Second edition
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200182
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Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies : An Experiment on King Solomon's Dilemma
Hagiwara, Makoto - 2020
) players' behavior. In addition, our experiment suggests that before participating in the auction stage in our mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012836381
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Exclusion in the all-pay auction : an experimental investigation
Fehr, Dietmar; Schmid, Julia - 2017 - Revised version of the WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2014-206
Contest designers or managers who want to maximize the overall revenue of a contest (relative performance scheme) are frequently concerned with a trade-off between contest homogeneity and inclusion of contestants with high valuations. In our experimental study, we find that it is not profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011638535