Similar Search Results

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

Auctioning Public Goods to Groups of Agents

Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - 1998

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to each group, which is not commonly known. We investigate an auction mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065955

A Strong Minimax Theorem for Informationally-Robust Auction Design

Brooks, Benjamin - 2020

We study the design of profit-maximizing mechanisms in environments with interdependent values. A single unit of a good is for sale. There is a known joint distribution of the bidders' ex post values for the good. Two programs are considered:(i) Maximize over mechanisms the minimum over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826866

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginal returns : the importance of the minimal value

Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - 2009

Previous research indicates that risky and uncertain marginal returns from the public good significantly lower contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty depend on the employed parameterization. Specifically, if the value of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003887174

Privately contributing to public goods over time : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Stiehler, Andreas - 2002

Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620765

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Sequential Contests with Incomplete Information : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Brookins, Philip; Matros, Alexander; Tzachrista, Foteini - 2022

In this paper, we investigate behavior in two-player sequential-move contests with complete and incomplete information about the value of the prize, theoretically and experimentally. First, we describe a Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential contest in which both players have private prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237552

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015

We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

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