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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012392226
An organization must decide which proposals to fund. In evaluating the proposals, the organization may rely on those applying for funding to produce evidence about the merits of their own proposals. We consider the role of a capacity constraint preventing the organization from funding all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295651
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The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets oneight markets in a computerized continuous double auction, indicate that objectivelyirrelevant information influences trading behavior. Moreover, positively and negativelyframed information leads to a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general conditions under which a given contest of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936799
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and also of his effort. We analyze the optimal reward for the designer when the reward is either multiplicatively separable or additively separable in effort and type. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069817
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We study the tails of closing auction return distributions for a sample of liquidEuropean stocks. We use the stochastic call auction model of Derksen et al. (2020a),to derive a relation between tail exponents of limit order placement distributions andtail exponents of the resulting closing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242302