We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open … investments are undertaken and the structural features of the economy such as factor intensity. We characterize expropriation …

political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation … institutional framework in the host country, the elite influences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of … expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization …

political power to expropriate productive assets. In a joint venture, the domestic asset owner bears the risk of expropriation … institutional framework in the host country, the elite influences the risk of expropriation. We determine the equilibrium risk of … expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization …

expropriation risk is different for the two kinds of investment. We test the model in a panel of 14 source countries and 24 host …