The debate over whether dual class of shares increases or decreases share value, should be prohibited or not, should be subjected to mandatory sunset provisions, and so on has been heating up over the last few years. This paper reviews the pros and cons of dual class of shares in light of more...

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company's common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation...

This study analyzed activism that leads to a merger or acquisition (M&A) of a firm to see its benefits for the shareholders at the target firm as well as its acquirer. It used over thirty years of data to understand the impact of the activists’ demands of strategic significance for the firms....

If a bidder launches a takeover offer for a listed company being part of a stock market index, then index funds and exchange traded funds (ETF) as shareholders of this company cannot easily tender their shares without losing track of the index. This paper analyzes the impact of index fund and...

This study investigates how CEO power is associated with stock price crash risk. We further examine the moderating roles of female directors’ critical mass and ownership structure on the relationship between CEO power and stock price crash risk. Employing one of the largest datasets to-date of...

This is an empirical study that examines the underpricing and aftermarket long-term performance of IPOs in China and IPO underpricing. Corporate governance aspects that may play a role in IPOs, such as ownership structure and external directors, are studied.The study show that firms with higher...

This paper examines the relationship between firm size, sovereign governance, and value-creation in acquisitions. The takeover literature suggests that size can enable managerial entrenchment and value-destruction. However, in weak governance environments, size might have off-setting benefits,...

This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In...

This paper proposes a theoretical model that incorporates corporate governance into the basic CAPM, where corporate governance affects the disutility of managerial effort and the possibility of managers to divert company resources. It shows that corporate governance affects firms’ stock...

We find a significant decline in average corporate bondholder value around events leading up to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), but only among bonds issued by firms that are expected to experience relatively large governance changes under SOX. Further, we do not find evidence that...